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Osberg et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
Inter-American System
IACHR Presents Report
Demonstrating its Preoccupation
with Women’s Lack of Access to
Maternal Health Services during
Visit to El Salvador
In November 2010, Commissioner
Luz Patricia Mejía, the Rapporteur
on the Rights of Women of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) presented a report addressing the link between women’s human
rights and access to pre-natal, childbirth,
and post-partum health care services.
Commissioner Mejía presented the thematic report to a group of government
officials and civil society organizations
in El Salvador. The report stresses states’
obligations to provide equal access to
maternal health services and reproductive
health information in accordance with the
right to humane treatment as protected by
Article 5 of the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention).
The report also stresses that many maternal
and infant mortalities could be prevented
through better information and medical
care, and that poor, indigenous, and Afrodescendant women are disproportionately
affected. During its October 2010 hearings,
the Commission emphasized the need to
improve marginalized populations’ access
to health services and information.
The report cites several Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court) decisions in which adequate health
care was deemed a key factor in preserving the right to humane treatment
under the American Convention. In its
2006 Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil decision,
the Court linked the right to health care to
the basic respect for dignity that all people
deserve. Similarly, the Court linked health
care with the rights to life and humane
treatment in its 2007 decision on AlbánCornejo et al. v. Ecuador. The Commission
relies heavily upon a 2007 report by the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) for
data on maternal health. PAHO’s report
highlights the region’s challenges of providing adequate, universal, and culturallyappropriate health care services. It cites

World Health Organization (WHO) estimates of 22,680 maternal deaths in the
Americas in 2003 and emphasizes that the
risk of maternal death is 21 times higher in
Latin America and the Caribbean than in
Canada. Moreover, the maternal mortality
rate of indigenous Guatemalan women is
three times higher than that of non-indigenous Guatemalans.
The Commission is especially concerned with structural and cultural barriers to maternal health, especially for
indigenous and Afro-descendant women.
High health care fees, lack of information,
adequate equipment, supplies, and properly trained personnel, and limited clinic
access prevent women from getting appropriate care. Barriers also include a lack of
interpretation services, a dearth of culturally-sensitive medical personnel, and the
denial of care due to gender, marital status,
or education level. Regional examples of
such barriers include cases of forced sterilization due to ethnic and economic status,
and refusal to provide abortion services to
a victim of sexual violence.
The thematic report recommends that
states strengthen their institutional capacities to guarantee adequate maternal health
care and training of providers, establish
referral mechanisms to deal with obstetrical emergencies, revise legislation to
ensure conformity with regional and international standards, and eliminate obstacles
to health services, in particular for marginalized populations. The Commission
also commends countries that have already
initiated health care reform by expanding
services to vulnerable groups.
The Commission’s report demonstrates
concern regarding the disproportionate
access that poor women, particularly indigenous or Afro-descendant women, have
to adequate, affordable, and timely health
care. It also indicates the commitment of
the Inter-American system to complying
with the Millennium Development Goal
of improving maternal health. Finally, it
further entrenches the right to health as a
fundamental right that goes hand in hand
with the right to life, humane treatment,
and respect of human dignity.
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Inter-American Court Invalidates
Amnesty Law Enacted during
Brazil’s Military Dictatorship
In its November 2010 landmark decision, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Inter-American Court) invalidated
Brazil’s 1979 Amnesty Law (Law No.
6683/79) protecting those who committed
atrocities during the country’s military
dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. In Gomes
Lund v. Brazil, the Inter-American Court
found that by impeding the investigation
of grave human rights violations, the 1979
Amnesty Law contravenes the American
Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), to which Brazil is a party.
In 1964, a military coup overthrew
Brazil’s existing constitutional government. Under the ensuing military dictatorship, murders, torture, arbitrary detention,
forced exile, and disappearances transpired
regularly. For example, in the early 1970s,
the Brazilian army arrested, tortured, and
killed members of a small guerrilla uprising in the Araguaia River region (Guerrilha
do Araguaia). The fate of many of the
guerrilla members still remains unknown.
In 1982, family members of 22 individuals disappeared during the Guerrilha do
Araguaia uprising initiated legal proceedings in an attempt to discover what happened to their relatives. The lower court
dismissed the case, but the court of appeals
reversed the dismissal. In 2003, more than
20 years after the families initiated their
suit, the First Federal Court ordered the
Brazilian government to release information about the disappeared guerrilla members. Appeals ensued over the course of the
next six years. In 2009, the same year the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) submitted the case
to the Inter-American Court, the Brazilian
Supreme Court affirmed the federal court’s
ruling and the government began releasing
thousands of pages of records regarding the
Guerrilha do Araguaia.
In Gomes Lund v. Brazil, the InterAmerican Court found that Brazil breached
its obligations under the American
Convention, including the rights to life,
liberty, and personal security (Articles 1,
4, and 7), juridical personality (Article
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3), humane treatment (Article 5), fair trial
(Article 8), and judicial protection (Article
25) by forcibly disappearing the victims
and withholding access to truth and information from their families. Brazil’s 1979
Amnesty Law, which exonerates those who
committed political crimes during the dictatorship, has also been interpreted by the
Brazilian Supreme Court as pardoning
government actors responsible for torture,
murder, and forced disappearance. The
Inter-American Court’s judgment requires
Brazil to ensure that the Amnesty Law does
not preclude the investigation and punishment of human rights violations committed
during the dictatorship and to establish
legislation criminalizing forced disappearances. Although Brazil has already taken
steps to recognize the atrocities committed
during the dictatorship, the Inter-American
Court ordered the State to continue raising awareness about human rights and to
acknowledge its acts of forced disappearance in the Araguaia River region.
The Court’s ruling against Brazil is the
third such decision invalidating amnesty
laws in the region; in 2001 and 2006,
respectively, the Court found amnesty
laws in Peru and Chile to be incompatible with the right to truth afforded by the
American Convention. In January 2010,
the Commission submitted a case against
Uruguay to the Inter-American Court proposing that Uruguay’s similar amnesty law
is blocking investigations of forced disappearances committed during the country’s
military dictatorship. With President Dilma
Rousseff in office, formerly jailed for her
involvement in 1970s guerilla operations,
and with continued efforts to establish a
truth commission to investigate crimes
committed during the military dictatorship,
Brazil appears to be on the way to uncovering secrets that have remained hidden for
over 30 years.

Mexican Congress Approves
Reparations Fund for Victims
of Human Rights Violations to
Comply with Inter-American Court
Judgments
At the end of 2010, the Mexican
Congress approved a budget of 30 million
pesos (almost 2.5 million USD) to establish a reparations fund for Mexican victims
of human rights violations. The fund is
specifically designated to fulfill judgments
handed down by the Inter-American Court

of Human Rights (Court), as well as to
compensate unspecified victims of past
human rights violations. The creation of
the reparations fund follows six Court
judgments against Mexico since it formally
accepted the Court’s competence in 1998.
Civil society organizations have
responded to the creation of the fund with
mixed reactions. Some are optimistic that
the fund signals progress by the Mexican
government to fulfill its obligations, while
others are concerned that it is merely a
means of temporary appeasement through
payment of monetary reparations and that
the government will not tackle larger institutional reforms ordered by the Court. The
Court ordered Mexico to investigate the
kidnapping and murder of three young
women in a cotton field near Ciudad
Juarez in its 2009 judgment in the case of
González (Cotton Field) v. Mexico. The
judgment additionally required Mexico to
improve its investigatory procedures related
to disappeared persons, especially women,
and to ensure that they meet international
standards. In its 2009 and 2010 judgments
in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Rosendo
Cantú v. Mexico, and Fernandez Ortega
v. Mexico, the Court ordered Mexico to
remove offenses committed by military
members against civilians from the jurisdiction of its military justice system, in
keeping with prior Inter-American system
precedent. The Court’s most recent ruling
in Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v.
Mexico reiterates this order. In all four of
those judgments, Mexico is required to
complete reform within a “reasonable”
time-period.
While Mexico’s Suprema Corte de
Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court)
acknowledges its international obligations
in the area of human rights in its 2010
Annual Report, Mexico’s actions to comply with the Court judgments appear to
be nascent. Despite 2010 deadlines for
compliance with the 2009 Cotton Field and
Radilla Pacheco judgments, Mexico has
only reported compliance with the monetary reparation measures in Castañeda
Gutman v. Mexico, the first of the six cases
adjudicated by the Court. In November
2010, Mexico reported on its initial actions
to comply with the Rosendo Cantú and
Fernandez Ortega judgments, but those
efforts did not include monetary reparations.

Similarly, Mexico has reported efforts
to comply with some, but not all, nonmonetary measures ordered in the six
judgments. The Supreme Court’s 2010
Annual Report mentions its investigation
into compliance with the Radilla Pacheco
judgment. It also references publication of
the judgment and coordination of a roundtable and conference on gender stereotypes
and access to justice per the 2009 Cotton
Field judgment. Although there is evidence
of Mexico’s attention to its criminal justice
system through constitutional reform, there
is no indication that Mexico is altering the
jurisdiction of the military justice system,
as required by the latest four judgments.
As compared to reports from prior
years, the Mexican Supreme Court’s 2010
Annual Report demonstrates progress in
the form of increased attention to compliance with the recent Court judgments.
Given that the Mexican Supreme Court
fielded 21 requests for information in
2010 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
related to eight petitions and other complaints received by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, there are
likely to be more cases against Mexico
in 2011. The reparations fund, along with
other compensatory measures required by
the Court, will be crucial in providing
Mexican victims of human rights violations the justice they have been denied for
so long.
Carson Osberg, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
the Inter-American System for the Human Rights
Brief.

Timely and Complete Compliance
by Panama in Tristán Donoso
Suggests Promising Direction
On September 30, 2010, Panama, a
state that only seven years ago challenged
the competence of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court) to monitor compliance with courtordered reparations, complied with reparations ordered in the 2009 decision in
Tristán Donoso v. Panama within the allotted timeframe. Although Panama is subject
to two judgments in which its full compliance is pending, the State’s immediate
action may indicate a policy shift towards
greater compliance with Inter-American
Court judgments.
Santander Tristán Donoso was a lawyer whose privileged conversation with
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a client was taped by an unknown party
and then released by Panama’s Attorney
General. When in a press conference,
Tristán Donoso accused the State of taping
the telephone conversation, the Attorney
General charged and convicted him for
criminal slander and libel. After Tristán
Donoso exhausted two constitutional challenges to the domestic law governing slander and libel, and successfully litigated
before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), the case was
submitted to the Inter-American Court.
The Inter-American Court found Panama
had violated the American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR) and ordered
Panama to compensate Tristán Donoso for
non-pecuniary damages, reimburse him
for litigation costs and expenses, announce
the judgment in a local newspaper, and
expunge his criminal conviction. Within
the 12-month period before the initial
report on compliance was due, Panama
complied fully.
Past cases have shown that compliance with Inter-American Court decisions
has often required extensive follow-up.
Panama’s timely compliance with the
Tristán Donoso judgment may indicate a
shift in the State’s attitude toward compliance, although the type of reparations
awarded in Tristán Donoso may have also
played a role. In the two other judgments
against Panama still in the supervisory
stage, the Inter-American Court ordered
Panama to make more extensive reparations. For instance, in Baena Ricardo et al
v. Panama, Panama was required to make
reparations in the form of large and ongoing payments to 270 victims. In Heliodoro
Portugal v. Panama, Panama was ordered,
among other reparations, to define the
crimes of forced disappearance and torture
in its domestic law, conduct investigations,
and provide free medical and mental health
benefits to the surviving victims.
Panama’s delays in complying fully
with the two previous decisions emphasize
the significance of their timely compliance
in Tristán Donoso. “I think that the speed
with which Panama complied is remarkable,” said David Baluarte, co-author of
From Judgment to Justice and Practitioner
in Residence with the International Human
Rights Law Clinic at American University
Washington College of Law. Panama’s
compliance is also historically significant.
In 2003, Panama brought the first challenge to the Inter-American Court’s com-

petence to monitor compliance following the judgment in Baena-Ricardo. The
State argued that post-judgment monitoring should be a political function, supervised by the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States (OAS).
While the Inter-American Court heard
Panama’s arguments, it concluded that the
Court’s competence to oversee fulfillment
of states’ commitments under Article 33
of the ACHR, the states’ recognition of the
Court’s jurisdiction and function enshrined
in Articles 62(1) and 62(3) of the ACHR, in
conjunction with the General Assembly’s
oversight as mandated in Article 65 of
the ACHR and Article 30 of the Statute
of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, conferred competence to the InterAmerican Court to continue to monitor
compliance.
Panama’s compliance with the reparations in Tristán Donoso is a small but exciting step in the direction of consistent and
timely compliance with Inter-American
Court judgments. “[T]his likely signals
that we can expect . . . something substantially similar from Panama in future cases
involving similar issues,” Baluarte said.
With two decisions still in the supervisory
stage, both with issues quite unlike those
in Tristán Donoso and reparations that
are larger in scale, Panama’s full compliance with all Inter-American Court decisions may still be elusive. However, the
compliance in Tristán Donoso remains an
encouraging move toward positive compliance practices from a state that previously
refused to recognize the Inter-American
Court’s competence to monitor compliance.

U.S. Death Row Inmate Executed
in Defiance of Commission’s
Recommendations
On October 26, 2010, the United
States executed Jeffery Timothy Landrigan
in violation of the 2004 precautionary
measures issued by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights for his benefit. The precautionary measures requested
the stay of Landrigan’s execution while
the Commission examined the sentencing
procedure by which he was condemned
to death. During the days leading up to
his execution, the Commission urged the
United States to honor the precautionary measures and ultimately issued a
merits report recommending review of
Landrigan’s trial, but to no avail.
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In 1990, Landrigan was sentenced to
death by a trial judge, as mandated by an
Arizona statute, instead of a jury. In the
2002 Ring v. Arizona case, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that type of
sentencing statute unconstitutional, but the
ruling did not mandate new sentencing
hearings for inmates whose appeals were
final on direct review. Since the Supreme
Court had denied Landrigan’s federal
habeas petition, he was not permitted a
new sentencing hearing.
Landrigan was one of nine inmates
represented in the original petition to
the Commission in 2004. Before the
Commission, the petitioners alleged that
the United States had violated Landrigan’s
rights enshrined in Articles 1 (life, liberty
and personal security), 2 (equality before
the law), 18 (fair trial), and 26 (due process
of law) of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man by denying him
the same opportunity as other prisoners to a
new sentencing hearing. The Commission,
upon hearing the allegations, awarded precautionary measures in 2004 that requested
the United States to refrain from executing
Landrigan until the Commission had an
opportunity to investigate his complaint.
On October 22, 2010, four days before
Landrigan was scheduled to be executed,
the Commission sent the United States a
merits report on his case recommending a
review of his trial in accordance with the
guarantees of the American Declaration.
The Commission also ordered the United
States to make its laws, procedures, and
practices around capital crimes compatible
with the American Declaration’s protection
of the rights to a fair trial, due process,
and equality before the law. The United
States nevertheless executed Landrigan on
October 26.
The United States frequently disregards the Commission’s precautionary
measures. In 2010 alone, two prisoners
benefiting from precautionary measures
were executed before the Commission had
an opportunity to issue a decision on their
petitions. In the 2000 case concerning Juan
Raul Garza, the first federal death row
inmate to be executed by the United States
in 35 years, the United States argued that
it did not consider the precautionary measures administered by the Commission to
be binding.
Additionally, in Garza’s case, the
United States argued that the Commission’s
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conclusion that the United States violated Articles 18 and 26 of the American
Declaration conflicted with “jurisprudence
based on the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.” In Landrigan’s case,
the United States did not rely on the U.S.
Constitution, instead arguing that the sentencing procedure in fact complied with its
obligations under the American Declaration.
The United States further claimed that
since the Supreme Court’s decision on the
unconstitutionality of judge-only sentencing did not mandate retroactive application to cases like Landrigan’s related to
procedural rather than substantive law, it
was not prejudicial. Ultimately, the United
States executed Landrigan despite the fact
that the procedure used to sentence him
was declared unconstitutional.The discord
between the Commission’s insistence that
United States’ laws and procedures must
comply with the American Declaration and
the United States’ assertion that either the
Declaration is not binding or that United
States domestic law is in compliance will
likely be a continuing source of dispute.
The United States has appeared more
responsive in the last decade by addressing alleged violations of the American
Declaration in its pleadings before the
Commission. Still, history indicates that
the United States will likely continue to
assert the legitimacy of domestic decisions
and execute death row inmates in defiance of precautionary measures and merits
reports that find law and procedure in the
United States in violation of the American
Declaration.
EmilyRose Johns, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
covers the Inter-American System for the Human
Rights Brief.

African Regional and Sub-Regional
Human Rights Systems
ECOWAS Community Court
of Justice Ruling Holds the
Government of Nigeria Accountable
for Fulfilling the Right to
Education despite Corruption
The Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) has ordered the government
of Nigeria to replenish a shortage of funds
in its education sector so that it may fulfill
its obligation under the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul

Charter) to provide free and compulsory
basic education to every Nigerian child.
As one of fifteen member states, Nigeria
is bound to comply with the Court’s judgment, considered by human rights lawyers to have permanently redefined human
rights-related jurisprudence on the continent.
The November 2010 judgment resulted
from a suit by the Registered Trustees
of the Socio-Economic Rights and
Accountability Project (SERAP) against
the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the
Universal Basic Education Commission
(UBEC). The complainant alleged that
Nigeria had violated its obligations under
the Banjul Charter regarding the right to
education (Article 17), the right to dignity (Article 5), the right of peoples to
freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources (Article 21), and the right of
peoples to economic and social development (Article 20). Specifically, SERAP
contended that rampant corruption among
high-level officials and theft within the
ranks of UBEC had left the education sector woefully underfinanced and unable to
provide free and compulsory education
to all Nigerian children. The Nigerian
government was complicit by its failure
to investigate allegations of corruption or
confront the culture of free license. SERAP
also contended that Nigeria has in effect
denied its citizens the right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources,
which are the bases for realizing the right
to education and other economic and social
rights.
SERAP’s allegations are based on a
report submitted to the Nigerian Presidency
in April 2006 that details the mismanagement of funds allocated for basic education
in ten Nigerian states and an October 2007
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
(ICPC) report detailing repeated instances
of theft by UBEC’s highest officials.
SERAP estimates that, as a direct consequence, over five million Nigerian children
lack access to primary education. In filing
suit, SERAP sought, inter alia, a declaration that every Nigerian child is entitled to
free and compulsory education pursuant
to Nigeria’s own domestic legislation and
an order compelling the government to
replenish the funds available to the education sector, prosecute those responsible for
theft or corruption, and monitor the recovery of stolen funds.
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A judgment on the merits would not
have been possible had the defendants prevailed on any of their preliminary objections, which challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, the justiciability of the right to
education, and SERAP’s standing as an
NGO. The Court rejected these objections in a separate October 2009 ruling
that is celebrated for affirming the Court’s
jurisdiction over States Parties’ human
rights obligations and NGOs’ standing as
representatives of the public interest. Both
procedural holdings are positive developments in the sub-regional human rights
system and, as the Court observed, reflect
the international trend to lower procedural
impediments to adjudication of human
rights issues.
On the merits, the Court began with
the corruption allegations, finding that
the ICPC report provided only prima facie
evidence of isolated incidents and, even if
true, did not prove the degree of negative
impact alleged by SERAP. The Court further clarified that corruption is a criminal
matter reserved to Nigeria’s domestic judicial institutions. Nonetheless it concluded
that there were insufficient funds in the
education sector for the Nigerian government to fulfill its obligations to realize
children’s right to education. The Court
declared that the government must cover
this shortfall regardless of its origins and
even while it investigates alleged corruption or theft.
The decision marks a victory for education advocates and represents a noteworthy development for socioeconomic rights
jurisprudence in the region. By requiring the government of Nigeria to sufficiently fund its education sector, the
Court reallocates the harsh consequences
of corruption and general neglect, forcing
the government to root out corruption or
compensate out of its budget. The court’s
position is interesting given international
human rights jurisprudence that generally
requires states to work only within or to
the maximum of available resources to
fulfill. In this case, however, the ECOWAS
Community Court has effectively imposed
a core minimum requirement despite evidence that Nigeria’s education sector is in
financial distress. Its decision makes clear
that corruption and chronic mismanagement of funds do not excuse Nigeria from
reaching a baseline standard in accordance
with its obligations.
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With the question of enforcement looming, SERAP issued an open letter urging
the eighteen current presidential candidates
to make full and effective implementation
of the judgment central to their campaigns.
Regardless of whether such political will
can be garnered within Nigeria, the Court’s
judgment advances regional jurisprudence
on states’ obligations to devote sufficient
resources to realizing social and economic
rights and, in the present case, champions
the position that children should not bear
the costs of corruption.

The Prohibition of Female Genital
Mutilation in Africa: A Test for
Africa’s Regional Human Rights
System
In 2008, the World Health Organization
with several partner UN agencies published
an interagency statement that detailed
efforts to reduce the practice of female
genital mutilation (FGM). The practice
continues on a staggering scale, most notably in Africa, where the statement estimated over 91 million women and girls had
been subjected to FGM, often with mental
and physical health-related consequences.
A further 3 million girls on the continent
face the risk of FGM every year.
Opposition to FGM in Africa can
be inferred from the Banjul Charter, its
Protocol on the Rights of Women (Maputo
Protocol), as well as the Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child (Children’s
Charter). The most explicit language is
found in Article 5 of the Maputo Protocol,
which calls upon its 28 States Parties
to prohibit “all forms of FGM” through
legislative measures and supportive sanctions. Although the meaning of “sanctions”
may be open to interpretation, Article 5
makes fairly clear what practical steps are
required of States Parties. But, it raises
critical questions about both the capacity
of States Parties to pass and enforce human
rights legislation that may run counter to
customary practice and the effectiveness of
Africa’s human rights institutions in confronting and sanctioning noncompliance.
Of the 28 States Parties to the Maputo
Protocol, twelve either had criminalized
FGM prior to ratification or did so afterward. Yet, in several of these states, legal
prohibition has had a negligible effect
on actual practice, as implementation has
stalled in local communities where FGM
is still considered part of tradition, com-

munity identity, and womanhood. Other
states seemingly pass legislation to please
the global community and comply with
international human rights instruments,
but have no genuine intention to implement
provisions on FGM. Compliance is thus
dependent not only on passing laws, but
on states’ ability — and political will — to
enforce laws and devise ways of furthering
even those regional human rights objectives that threaten deeply entrenched social
conventions held by local communities.
When other States Parties lack sufficient political will to pass legislation,
responsibility falls on Africa’s human
rights institutions to use their authority
to enforce Article 5 obligations. In 1999,
the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights appointed its first Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in
Africa, tasked, inter alia, with overseeing State Party efforts to implement the
Banjul Charter and the Maputo Protocol.
However, while the Special Rapporteur’s
office is authorized to expose noncompliance and propose recommendations to the
Commission, it has no means of sanctioning noncompliant States Parties. Worse, the
Commission’s recommendations following
consideration of individual or NGO complaints are not generally considered legally
binding.
The African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights is also charged under
Article 27 of the Maputo Protocol with “all
matters of interpretation arising from [the
Protocol’s] application or implementation.”
However, while a complaint concerning
alleged violations of Article 5 could theoretically reach the Court, it would have to
be based not on an instance of FGM within
a given State Party, but rather on the failure
of that state’s government to pass legislation prohibiting the practice. It is not clear
who would have standing to bring such a
case, based on direct harm from a State
Party’s failure to pass legislation. Nor is it
clear under the Court’s Protocol what steps
might be taken to enforce compliance with
a Court decision even though it would be
legally binding.
As with many other pressing human
rights issues in Africa, eliminating the
practice of FGM requires efforts on two
fronts. First, compliant states must communicate regional human rights standards
to communities with opposing core beliefs.
Article 5 requires that States Parties under57

take education and public-awareness campaigns in conjunction with legislation outlawing the practice. The UN interagency
statement suggests that FGM rates decline
most when states undertake prevention
as well as punishment. Second, Africa’s
human rights institutions must continue to
work, despite their limitations, to ensure
that States Parties comply with the human
rights obligations they have undertaken
through voluntary ratification of regional
instruments. Unless these institutions find
more effective ways to secure State Party
compliance, it is unlikely that regional
human rights norms will reach the communities where harmful traditional practices
such as remain most prevalent.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
covers the African Regional and Sub-Regional
Systems for the Human Rights Brief.

European Court of Human Rights
European Court Institutes Priority
Policy for Hearing Claims
In accordance with an amendment to
its Rules of Court, the European Court
of Human Rights (Court) will now hear
cases based on the urgency of the violation, as opposed to the chronological order
of receipt. The change will ensure urgent
claims are not lost in the Court’s massive
caseload, but such expediency may come at
the expense of lesser violations, which may
never be heard.
As part of its new Priority Policy, the
Court will place each pending claim into a
category – numbered I through VII – based
on the level of importance. Claims that
detail particular risk to life or health of the
applicants will be given highest priority.
Claims that deal with matters of admissibility receive the lowest priority. While
the Priority Policy actually went into effect
in July 2009, the Court only recently made
public its grading criteria. The Court sometimes gave priority to particularly urgent
cases prior to 2009, but the new policy
establishes a clear order of adjudication at
a time when the Court’s pending caseload
exceeds 130,000 applications, a number
which rose by 17 percent in 2010.
The categories are as follows:
I – Urgent applications that show
a particular risk to life or health
of the applicant; other circum-

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
stances linked to the personal or
family situation of the applicant,
particularly where the well-being
of a child is at issue

heard only when cases in priority levels
I-IV have been adjudicated, allowing the
Court to focus on only the most serious
violations.

II – Applications capable of having an impact on the effectiveness
of the European Convention on
Human Rights

However, the subjective nature of labeling priorities raises concerns regarding
the introduction of bias into the process,
and could possibly encourage violators
to commit low-priority offenses with no
fear of punishment. A number of serious
questions must be asked and continually
monitored as the Court transitions to its
Priority Policy. Should a petitioner who
was deprived of a fair and public hearing
be any less aggrieved because his claim
falls fourth on the spectrum? What about
those who have been denied their rights
to free speech and religion, who now may
wait years or decades behind those whose
claims are deemed “more urgent?” The
Court reserved an important right by granting the Chamber or its President the opportunity to decide that an individual case
should be treated outside the parameters of
the Policy, but it is uncertain how often that
right will be invoked.

III – Applications that raise complaints under Article 2 (right to
life), 3 (protection from torture),
4 (protection from slavery) and 5
§ 1 (right to liberty and security)
IV – Potentially well-founded
applications based on other
Articles
V – Applications raising issues
already dealt with
VI – Applications identified as
giving rise to a problem of admissibility
VII – Applications which are
manifestly inadmissible
According to a press release issued
by the Court, the Priority Policy’s “aim is
clearly to ensure the most serious cases
and the cases which disclose the existence
of widespread problems capable of generating large numbers of additional cases
are dealt with more rapidly.” However,
while the policy should ensure the most
important cases are heard without delay, it
could have a fatal effect on claims of lower
priority. The Court will admittedly hear
fewer cases because its most urgent claims
often are its most time consuming, requiring complex analysis of the nuances within
the Convention’s articles to be applied to
the facts at hand. This creates the potential
that applications without priority may, as
human rights professor Dr. Antoine Buyse
wrote on his ECHR Blog, “remain on the
docket virtually eternally.”
The policy is yet another stab at efficiency for the Court, which has been under
pressure to reduce its caseload by narrowing its scope. While human rights advocate
Christos Pourgourides stressed the need
for subsidiarity as a reduction tactic, the
Priority Policy may be a more feasible
solution. When it becomes clear that the
Court refuses to address certain topics
due to their level of priority, the submission of those claims will eventually cease.
Repetitive cases and applications that give
rise to the problem of admissibility will be

How the Court applies its new Priority
Policy will determine the Court’s efficacy
for years to come. As such, a Working Party
will monitor the policy’s implementation
and address any inequalities that arise.
Should such issues emerge, the policy
may need modification. In the meantime,
it appears to be a much-needed remedy to
an increasingly outmatched Court system
and its implementation is certain to be
watched closely by other regional human
rights systems, such as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, as a possible solution to their own crushing backlog of cases.

Court Rules on Ireland Abortion
Rights Cases
A long-awaited decision by the
European Court of Human Rights regarding abortion rights in Ireland inspired
claims of victory from both sides of the
debate, but plenty of questions still remain
regarding implementation of the decision.
On Dec. 16, 2010, the Grand Chamber
ruled that Ireland breached the right to private and family life (Article 8) of a woman
whose access to legal abortion in Ireland
was infringed upon by the government. The
Court found no violation, however, with
respect to the other two applicants in the
case – A, B, and C v. Ireland.
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Critics of Ireland’s strict abortion laws
instantly lauded the decision as a crack
in the established policies. Anti-abortion
proponents countered that the Court’s judgment does nothing more than reinforce
laws already in Ireland’s constitution. The
true effect on Ireland’s abortion laws –
considered some of the strictest among
States Parties to the European Convention
on Human Rights – likely lies somewhere
in the middle.
Currently, abortion in Ireland is only
legal when a woman’s life is at stake due to
pregnancy. As such, thousands of women
travel from Ireland to England and Wales
each year seeking legal abortions. The
applicants to the complaint – two Irish
nationals and one Lithuanian – all traveled
to the United Kingdom in 2005 for abortions. The first applicant, a poor, unmarried, and unemployed woman living in
poverty, chose to have an abortion to avoid
“jeopardizing her chances of reuniting her
family.” The second applicant chose to
have an abortion because she did not want
to become a single parent. The third applicant, from Lithuania, was in remission
from cancer and chose an abortion out of
fear the cancer would return. As reported in
the Court’s press release, “[t]he third applicant submitted that, although she believed
her pregnancy put her life at risk, there was
no law or procedure through which she
could have that, and, as a result, her right to
an abortion in Ireland, established.”
Essentially, as New York Times reporter
and Yale Law School professor Linda
Greenhouse pointed out, the Court “made
clear that it was not recognizing a right
to abortion. On behalf of Plaintiff C, who
could not find an Irish doctor willing to
help her even assess her risks, it was simply
telling Ireland that if the country chose to
offer a life-saving exception to its abortion
ban, it had to give women ‘an accessible
and effective procedure’ to demonstrate
that they qualified.”
What the decision means for Ireland’s
future depends on the implementation of
the ruling. As a State Party to the European
Convention on Human Rights, Ireland must
somehow ensure similar violations do not
occur in the future. One way the Republic
may do this is by softening abortion legislation and joining many of its European
peers in a pro-choice stance. A more likely
solution for this conservative country is to
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better legislate the anti-abortion exception,
or, perhaps, to eliminate it entirely.
Abortion rights in Ireland are still new
enough that some envision a possible swift
return to abolition. The anti-abortion stance
is rooted in an 1861 law that made abortion
a criminal act. It was only in 1992 that the
Irish Supreme Court allowed abortion and,
in that case, only if the situation presented
a “substantial risk to a mother’s life.”
While several government officials
have said the Court’s ruling mandates further legislation, the Archbishop of Armagh,
Sean Brady, said there was no obligation to
change Irish law, and further reiterated
the Catholic Church’s stance that neither
the unborn child nor the mother may be
killed under any circumstance. “The Irish

Constitution clearly says that the right to
life of the unborn child is equal to that of
his or her mother,” Cardinal Brady said.
“These are the fundamental human rights
at stake.”
The world will watch with interest
how Ireland chooses to apply the Court’s
ruling. The United States, for example,
may encounter similar debates when the
conservative-led House of Representatives
convenes for the next Congress and newly
elected conservative state legislators take
office. In Nebraska, a conservative legislature passed a ban on abortion after 20
weeks, even though most states’ bans on
abortions begin at 22 or 24 weeks. If more
states are successful in passing similar
legislation, the country’s landmark 1973
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abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, could be
challenged and potentially weakened.
Even the three European countries
whose abortion laws have been described as
equal to, or more restrictive than, Ireland’s
– Andorra, Malta, and San Marino – may
feel emboldened that the Court did not
establish a minimum degree of protection
for women seeking abortion. While not
beholden to Ireland’s implementation of
the Court’s ruling, anti-abortionists could
look to the Republic for cues.
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